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These tragic days, when so large a part of the world is being de­
stroyed, to talk of governmental regulation of corporate accounting may 
to some of you, recall the poet’s line about "lecturing on navigation 
while the ship is going down," or Anatole France’s comment that "we 
should conceive a positive pity for our economists arguing with one an­
other about the cost of the furniture in a burning house.”
Put those of you who are in that mood should also recall President 
Roosevelt’s recent remarks when he signed the Investment Company Act and 
the Investment Advisers Act. ’’These Acts,” he said, "give the Securities 
and Exchange Commission power to regulate investment trusts and invest­
ment counselors. They mark another milestone in this Administration’s 
vigorous program ... to protect the investor. As the pressure of in­
ternational affairs increases, we are ready for the emergency because of 
our fight to put our domestic affairs on a true democratic basis. We are 
cleaning house, putting our financial machinery in good order. This pro­
gram is essential, not only because it results in necessary reforms, but 
for the much more important reason that it will enable us to absorb the ♦ 
shock of any crisis.”
I
There could be no single more deadly blow to the protection afforded to in­
vestors by the SEC than a successful attack on its accomplishments in 
the field of corporate accounting. Without the SEC supervision of ac­
counts, regulation of the issuance of utility securities under the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 would be meaningless and the Securi­
ties Act of 1933 would be a joke.  
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It is for that reason that I want to discuss the assault, on the ac­
countancy work of the SEC, launched by John M. Hancock, of Lehman Brothers 
on April 26, 1940, in a speech entitled "Responsibility on the Part of 
the Public Accountant and His Client." There he referred to what he 
called "the Securities Acts and their administration," and, noting that 
annual corporate reports to stockholders are not within the scrutiny of 
the SEC under those Acts, said that "a better Job is being done in the 
unregulated field, than in the field covered by regulation." Admitting 
the need and value of auditors' reports, he spoke of "the trend of de­
velopment in this field over the last six years” which seemed to him "to 
have placed a false emphasis upon the need and value" of such reports. 
Mentioning the days when monkish "mental gymnasts" theorized as to how 
many angels could stand on the point of a needle, he said, "In these days 
the same kind of mind — possessing plenty of intelligence but lacking 
in Judgment — seems to be busy in developing all sorts of precise prac­ 
tices for improving accounting methods and results.” "I think," he re­
marked, "the current drift is towards an undue emphasis upon the accuracy 
of accounting for corporate reports." And he doubted whether "there is 
any warrant for devoting working time to a consideration of many of the 
finely spun arguments striving for absolute accuracy of annual reports." 
The "attempt to get so precise ... is not worthwhile," he commented; 
and asserted that "there is no sound usefulness in the extreme precision 
and extended presentation now being demanded." And he emphasized "the 
impassibility of absolute factual accuracy in accountants’ reports." 
Observe what Mr. Hancock has done: He has pictured the SEC as con­
sisting of intelligent but academic theorists and impossibilists —
— 3 -
monkish "mental gymnasts” striving, foolishly, in a necessarily imper­
fect world, for absolute, perfection.    
I want to discuss that ridiculous picture and to demonstrate its 
falsity for these reasons: First, it is being paraded about the country
 
by a small group of ultra-conservative investment bankers who are engaged 
in an effort to have the Securities Act gutted by amending it in such a 
way that the SEC would be powerless to prevent the sale of certain large 
security issues — even if the registration statements were clearly false 
and misleading. Second, such a picture, if it were believed to be accur­
ate, would discredit the important work which the SEC, in cooperation 
with such organization as yours, has done in gradually raising the stan­
dards of corporate accounting and in establishing some relatively uniform 
procedures in order that investors, and the public generally, will be 
better informed as to what corporate managements are doing with the assets 
of investors entrusted to their care.
In sharply disagreeing on the subject of corporate accounting with 
Mr, Hancock and with those investment bankers who accept his views, I am 
distinctly not to be understood as expressing any personal animus towards 
him or them on the part of the SEC or myself. In a democracy, all men, 
of course are entitled freely to criticize any aspect of government. 
And such criticism should not provoke anger in those government officials 
who are criticized. Freedom to reply to the criticism, however, is the 
privilege of those officials. And a reply, by one on the SEC, to ad­
verse comments by an investment banker must not be interpreted as an ex­
pression of hostility towards the critic in particular or investment 
bankers as a group. The SEC has always recognized that the investment
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bankers perform a vital function in our economy: They supply one of the 
means by which the savings of our citizens are converted into labor-pro­
ducing plant expansion; without the investment bankers, America could not 
have grown as it did, and could not continue to grow. But a recognition 
of those facts, and respect for Mr. Hancock in particular as an able in­
vestment banker, do not require that I refrain from saying — without 
any rancor — that I have little respect for the kind of attitude he has 
expressed with respect to corporate accounting and its regulation by the 
SEC. That attitude can be illuminated by observing a similar attitude 
in another field:
Time was, not so long ago, when a physician, engaged in making an 
educated guess as to what was wrong with a patient and as to his future 
health, relied chiefly on the appearance of the patient, his pulse, his 
temperature, a glance at his tongue and throat, and on the physician's 
trained Judgment, based on his background of previous experience. To­
day, most physicians also employ a multitude of laboratory tests. Sup­
pose now that a critic of modern medical practice came before you and 
said: "What's the use of all this expensive laboratory hocus-pocus? 
It's sheer nonsense to expect absolute exactitude in medicine, and these 
newfangled gadgets can't produce it. Nor will their use make everybody 
well. A doctor must exercise Judgment; and Judgment based solely on 
laboratory tests is no substitute for the good old ways. Many patients 
were cured before there were any medical laboratories*  Let's scrap 
them and go back to the old, simple, observational methods."
Such remarks are an instance of dangerous uncompromising think­
ing. They present a false antithesis. They divide the subject of
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medical practice up into two distinct hemispheres: first, one in which 
doctors make their educated guesses as to a patient's present and future 
health without modern laboratory aids and second, one in which those aids 
and nothing else are employed. It erroneously depicts two and only two 
alternatives. Of course, today no physician in his senses relies solely 
on laboratory techniques. He uses Judgment based upon both the old and 
the new methods.
But the critic stupidly insists on either the old or the new. And 
he rejects the new because (1) it alone is Insufficient (as every doctor 
knows) and (2) it does not bring perfection in doctors' educated guessing 
(which no doctor or intelligent patient expects).
Such a critic dogmatically employs what may be called "either-or" 
thinking, an approach which is wholly fallacious with respect to most 
subjects — including accountancy Since it unwisely confines attention 
to one of two possible methods. Usually, there is not such a limited 
choice — as if between black or white. There is a spectrum of choices; 
or, rather there are choices between several possible blendings of methods, 
old and new. Frequently, the new does not displace the old but supplements 
and improves it. 
What we need is "both-and" thinking which says, "We want some of this 
and also some of that," which does not pit the "purely" good against the 
"purely" evil, but makes nicer discriminations and differentiations. You 
will note that science employs graduated scales of value. It does not 
portray heat versus cold, but speaks rather of 20 degrees or 60 degrees 
or 100 degrees of temperature.
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We should beware of the dogmatic "either-or" man. He is, in most in­
stances, a kind of perfectionist; and perfectionists are dangerous people 
who often stultify progress and prevent desirable change. The sin of per­
fectionism is that it mutilates life by demanding the impossible. 
Perhaps I should be a little more explicit. There are, I suggest, 
two kinds of perfectionists. The positive perfectionist is a man who in­
sists that men must live up to his ideals even if they are impossible of 
attainment. He demands the impossible in conduct. He is impatient with 
anything short of absolute perfection. But, in his favor it should be 
noted that he is usually aggressive - forward moving - in his search for 
perfection.
There is, also, the negative perfectionist. He is against all change 
because it will not bring perfection. Unless a proposed forward step 
will produce the "absolutely” perfect, he opposes it. He prefers whatever 
exists, no matter how bad, unless it can be supplanted by a flawless sub­
stitute. He is a passive resister. He usually tries to defeat a particu­
lar change by mistakenly charging that its proponents claim perfection. 
He erroneously reports them as saying, "This new device will have no de­
fects." He ignores their qualifying adverbs, puts in their mouths words 
which they never uttered, and ascribes to them attitudes which they never 
entertained. He somehow induces himself to believe that they are 100% 




The speech of Mr, Hancock is an excellent specimen of that kind of 
absolutist or negative perfectionist approach in its most pronounced form. 
You will recall how, in favorably contrasting (1) unregulated accounting 
with (2) accounting when regulated by the SEC, he characterized the latter 
as involving an impossible striving for "extreme precision" and for "ab­
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solute factual accuracy,”
You see, at once, the tactics of the negative perfectionist: Mr. 
Hancock has loaded the dice in favor of unregulated corporate accounting. 
He describes, as the one and only alternative, a kind of regulation 
which seeks to require the "extreme" and the "absolute." If that descrip­
tion were correct, there could be but one verdict; regulated accounting 
under the Securities Act would be ridiculous. If the choices were, in 
truth, restricted to the two presented by Mr. Hancock, no sane man would 
fail to elect in favor of unregulated accounting — in favor either of. 
the repeal of most of the Securities Act or the condemnation of those who 
have administered it.
But that picture is absurd. The Securities Act does 
not contemplate anything so impossible as "absolute accuracy” or "ex­
treme precision" in accounting. Nor does the SEC seek to obtain it. As 
you are well aware, its aims are far more restrained. It strives for 
improvements in accounting standards, admitting freely that perfection 
is unattainable. That the SEC does not deal in "absolutes" or "extremes" 
is well known to most of the accounting profession which, I am glad to 
say, has cheerfully cooperated with us in striving to improve corporate 
accounting — and without aiming to reach the moon of perfectionism.
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Neither the SEC nor the accountants discard all the old techniques (necessarily 
involving judgment), nor assume that all the new and. improved accounting 
standards -- which are gradually being evolved — will ever exclude all 
error and produce absolute precision and infallibility. But you and the 
SEC believe that accounting must be constantly reexamined, and that re­
visions of procedures must be made again and again, in order that the 
profession may serve the current needs of the investing public with all 
practicable efficiency. To my mind, bur cooperative program has not 
over-emphasized the need and value of your reports as auditors; and I be­
lieve the improvements which have been made have been salutary.
Mr. Hancock deplores "the kind of attacks which have been made 
upon management and upon auditors during recent years." If he means un­
fair attacks, I concur. If he means severe criticism of some managements and 
auditors based upon such cases as McKesson & Robbins or some of the 
cases recently reported in our investment trust studies, then he is 
surely wrong. I hope that, in that respect, I have misunderstood him. 
But I do go along with him in objecting to those who have tried to put 
business, as a whole, "in the dog house." It is Just because I think 
that indiscriminate efforts to over-populate the kennels with business­
men should be avoided that I trust that, by the cooperation of honest 
practical businessmen, accountants and government, we can make life so 
hard for the crooks that honest businessmen may not unfairly be accused 
because of the misdeeds of their dishonest fellows.  
As the heart of Mr. Hancock's attack on SEC regulation of accounting 
is to be found in his commendation of the unregulated annual corporate 
reports to stockholders, it is of interest to note that the New York
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Herald Tribune — a most conservative newspaper — said, on August 22, 
1940, of those unregulated reports: "While a number of corporations have 
realized the wisdom of publishing informative, detailed reports of their 
operations, complete with comparisons and share earnings, there are still 
too many companies which believe that the function of the report is to 
obfuscate rather than to elucidate."
That statement is amply confirmed by the exhaustive studies conducted 
by the SEC of malpractices by certain investment trusts.  In our report 
to Congress on the accounting methods of those companies we. said, in part:
"With this large industry almost completely unregulated and unsuper­
vised information concerning these abuses and some protection against 
them might have been afforded the investing public had there been in gen­
eral use a sound and recognized body of uniform accounting principles 
and practices. The Commission’s study of the accounting practices of in­
vestment companies has disclosed, however, that during the period studied 
there was almost completely lacking in the investment company industry 
any such recognized body of uniform accounting principles and practices. 
Instead, there reigned such diversity and confusion, that accountancy some 
times was transformed into an instrumentality by which abuses were both 
perpetrated and concealed rather than exposed. It is clear that the man­
agements of many investment companies, free from almost any restraint, 
favored those accounting practices in connection with their companies
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which were not in accordance with sound accounting principles, but rather 
according to whatever designs seemed to the managements best fitted to 
promote their Immediate objectives, and the adaptability of one method or 
another to the accomplishment of these ends. So great was the variety of 
accounting practices in use among the various companies that the terse 
terminology of the stockholders' report became either unintelligible or 
definitely Misleading. The few short words which traditionally comprise 
the vocabulary of income statement and balance sheet - "income,” "profit,” 
"capital,” ’’surplus” — were invested with such varied and conflicting 
significance that they afforded no true measure of the performance of the 
individual company, and rendered almost impossible accurate comparisons 
between companies.
"For example, at least four different methods were available to in­
vestment companies in computing the cost of securities disposed of from 
a block which had been acquired at different times and prices. Fre­
quently, the use of one or another of these methods would result in the 
recording of a "profit” on the sale, while use of the others would have 
produced a loss. In consequence, it frequently occurred that a company 
which reported substantial earnings fundamentally had a position no 
better than another company which reported a loss, due to the use of 
varying criteria of cost measurement. Moreover, from one year to the 
next, behind apparently identical earnings reported by a company might 
lie very different results caused by a shift from one method of deter­
mining cost to another. In the same manner, and with like effect, 
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securities carried in the portfolios of investment companies were valued 
in accordance with four distinct standards, each of which affected in­
vestment and profit accounts differently.
“Reports to stockholders were found to be deficient in numerous re­
spects. Some were deficient in their failure to reveal the basis of com­
putation of profits or losses upon sales of securities ... In others 
there was a deception arising from the failure to qualify the amounts of  
profits and losses when portfolio securities had been disposed of after 
a write-down. . . Likewise, trading losses were considerably Understated. 
. . . By a failure in some Instances to publish adequate analysis, re­
serve accounts became instrumentalities for covering up realized losses 
and for the distortion of trading results. Similarly inadequate analyses 
of surplus accounts in published reports led to the concealment of sub­
stantial realized losses. . . .
“Accountants’ certificates which accompanied statements sent to 
stockholders were often characterized by equivocal phrases and material 
omissions. The statements themselves appear to have been more often in­
scrutable than informative. . . The conclusion seems unavoidable that 
large numbers of stockholders were led to repose confidence in reports 
which would otherwise have aroused their suspicion, by the very presence 
in these reports of the names and certificates of certified public 
accountants. Although this may have resulted in some measure from the 
failure of the public to apprehend the limited nature of the accountants’ 
engagement or from the fact that those limits were not made known, the 
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study discloses that, even within the scope of their contractual duties, 
the work of many accountants was replete with faults, both of omission 
and commission, which contributed materially to the end result. It is 
a commonplace, tp which the present study gives point and substance, that 
protection which does not protect is more dangerous than none at all."
It is gratifying to note that Mr. Hancock’s eloquence did not per­
suade his own business associates. For Mr. Arthur Bunker of Lehman Cor­
poration (affiliated with Mr. Hancock's banking house) in the summer of 
this year — a few months after Mr. Hancock’s attack on the accounting 
provisions of the Securities Act and their administration by the SEC — 
Joined with other leaders of the investment trust industry and with the 
SEC in recommending the Bill which, in August — without a single dis­
senting vote in either house of Congress — became the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. That Act contains provisions which go beyond 
the Securities Act of 1933 in conferring upon the SEC powers to regu­
late the shockingly sub-standard accounting practices which had 
occurred in parts of that industry. The business spokesmen for that 
industry recognized that the establishment, by SEC regulation under leg­
islation, of decent accounting standards was essential to protect honest 
managements from unfair competition by dishonest managements. They did 
not accept Mr. Hancock’s views that legislation of tnat kind "hampers or 
prevents ... sound healthy business life."
And they did not agree with him that annual corporate reports 
to stockholders, not subject to SEC scrutiny, show that in
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corporate accountancy ”a better Job is being done in the unregulated field 
than in the field covered by regulation” or that "the tendency for law or 
regulation is to set up either unworkable standards or low standards . . ." 
For the Investment Company Act specifically gives the SEC jurisdiction over 
the annual reports of investment companies to their stockholders.
To Mr. E. P. Connely, President of the IBA, such governmental scrutiny 
is "espionage." That, of course, is mere name-calling. It could be em­
ployed to damn any necessary governmental scrutiny; Shall we say, for in­
stance, that government bank examiners, inspecting a bank, are engaged in 
"espionage," and shall we, accordingly, abolish government bank examinations? 
At any rate, many of the investment bankers, who sponsored the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and who are also leading members of Mr. Connely’s IBA, 
plainly did not accept his philosophy.
Investment companies, however, comprise Only a small fragment of our 
corporations. The reports of most corporations to shareholders have for 
the most part been subject neither to scrutiny by a governmental agency, 
nor to specific statutory requirements. Many, in the 1920’s and early 
'30's, used the "dance card" report — a ten-item balance sheet, and pos­
sibly a few kind words by the president. A reasonably detailed income 
statement was a rarity. The critics of the time, many of whom were ac­
countants, were by no means oblivious to these shortcomings.  The condem­
nation by W. Z. Ripley*  has become classic. You may say that such examples 
are of a long past area. By no means. True, there has been some improve­
ment — and particularly so because, after the passage of the Securities Acts, 
* Main Street and Wall Street (1926)
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many accountants have refused to certify annual statements unless in sub­
stantial conformity to the annualreport forms/filed with the S.E.C. But many 
areas of Information are still omitted from the reports sent to stockhold­
ers. The far flung industrial empire of parent, subsidiaries, and inter­
vening holding companies is still reflected, for the most part only in the 
form of consolidated statements. The balance sheet of the parent, the only 
entity in which its stockholders have a direct interest, is seldom made 
available, even when there are large minorities or heavy debts in the sub­
sidiaries — all ranking ahead of the parent’s creditors. When consolida­
tion is not complete, separate statements, even for important unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, are the exception. Often nothing is said as to the relation 
between the earnings and dividends of subsidiaries or as to the increase 
or decrease in the parent’s equity. Sometimes not even the extent of the 
minority interest is separately shown. In one case at least, the balance 
sheet was for one group of companies — the income statement for another. 
Can these be examples of information unnecessary for an investor? I think 
not.
A study we have made of reports sent to stockholders shows many cases 
of deficiencies in vital information. What profit is. it to the investor to 
know that t,he lump sum of cost of goods sold (including, without a break­
down, selling, general and administrative expenses) is so much or, indeed, 
merely that the difference between these expenses and net sales, both un­
disclosed, is such and such an amount? Much better than nothing, perhaps,
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but is it comparable in adequacy and informativeness with the reasonably 
 
itemized statement of income and expenses, required in reports to the 
S. E, C., and found more and more frequently in the annual reports of the 
progressive companies?  
In the course of our consideration of particular cases, accountants 
on our staff have again and again told us that there was no single well- 
settled practice in a given field. Indeed, in some cases there has been 
a wide divergence in the views of various members of the staff as to the 
proper practice to be followed.  Adoption of one or the other would have 
resulted in wide differences in the amount of reported income and assets. 
The organization and operation on your part of a research department is 
also evidence of diversity in practice, Many of our footnotes are designed 
to require a disclosure, in reports to the SEC, of the accounting policies 
followed in a particular field. Yet a comparison of the unregulated annual 
reports sent to stockholders with the filings with the S. E. C. (10-K re­
ports) clearly shows that most of these footnotes are omitted from the 
former. So long as wide divergence in practice exists, can such omissions 
be Justified? Or is it to be concluded that it is unimportant to an in­
vestor how income is computed -- so long perhaps as the result of the 
computation is shown?
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Commission has 
power with respect to proxies of corporations, the securities of which are 
listed on a national exchange. Pursuant to that provision, we require 
the furnishing of certain information as a basis for the solicitation of
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proxies; and, if financial statements are called for, there is a tendency 
to assimilate the annual stockholders’ report and the proxy statement. In 
that indirect way, we do have some effect on the annual reports of listed 
corporations.  Under the Securities Act of 1933, however, we have, virtually 
no direct or indirect power over such annual reports. The obligation to 
file statements with us has had, to be sure, the collateral effect of placing 
the unregulated report to stockholders on the defensive, if it differs 
substantially. But that is not a very effective method. The Investment 
Company Act goes further, as I have pointed out, with respect to investment 
companies.
There is a provision in the Trust Indenture Act which opens up an 
almost new field for conveying information to security holders: A corporate 
borrower, subject to that Act, is required to file reports with our Com­
 
mission comparable to those required of listed companies under the Exchange 
Act. Rut the Trust Indenture Act goes beyond that point. It requires the 
borrower to transmit to each security holder such summaries of those reports 
as may be required by rules and regulations issued by the Commission. The re­
cipients of these reports are not stockholders --- but bondholders or debenture­
holders. This is a partial recognition of the principle to which the 
Supreme Court last year adverted, in v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, that
the officers of a corporation owe fiduciary obligations to "the corporation, 
  
its stockholders and creditors.” We are confronted under that. Act with 
these problems: Of what should these summaries, sent to bondholders, 
consist? Should they approach a prospectus in scope? Or the brevity of 
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the average stockholders' report? Being designed for bondholders, as 
distinguished from stockholders, what special features and what differences, 
if any, from annual stockholders' reports should be introduced? These 
questions are not yet decided, Before they are, we shall again, as we 
have in the past, seek your counsel and explore your suggestions. Put I 
have no doubt that the result at which we will arrive will give the bond­
holders much greater accounting detail than Mr. Hancock thinks they should 
have.
In Mr. Hancock's paper he referred frequently to an alleged suggestion 
that corporate accounting could and should eliminate the exercises of 
judgment on the part of accountants, and enable investors to make unerring 
judgments as to future corporate earnings and as to the future market value 
of corporate securities. He characterized such a proposal as "sheer non­
sense." Now no one connected with the SEC has ever made such a ridi­   
culous suggestion. I agree that such a notion, to use Mr. Hancock’s phrase, 
is "sheer nonsense." If science cannot predict next week’s weather with 
any degree of accuracy, how can any intelligent person believe it possible 
to predict, with exactitude, future corporate earnings — which are a 
function of innumerable unknowable variables?
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 Since, however, in October 1939, I made a speech, "Accounting for 
Investors," in which I discussed the possibility of improved accounting 
as an aid to somewhat better educated guessing about future corporate earn­
ings, and since, far as I know, no one else in the SEC has as exten­
sively discussed the subject of the relation of accounting to earning 
forecasts, it is fairly obvious that Mr. Hancock was referring to that 
speech of mine. It is true that I there suggested that accounting for 
investors— which I differentiated from accounting for other purposes — 
should give considerably more emphasis to those aspects of the corpora­
tion’s history bearing on its past earnings and their causes so as to 
furnish somewhat more assistance to the investor than he can now obtain 
in forming a Judgment as to the company’s future earnings. But I went 
on, at considerable length, in that speech to point out that by no possi­
bility could any corporate accounts reflect the numerous factors — many 
of them unknowable by anyone — which an investor would need to know if 
it were ever to be possible for him to form anything like a precise Judg­
ment as to a company’s future earning power or the market value of his 
securities. Time and again I stressed the impossibility of an accurate 
prediction as to such matters.
That speech of mine was published in The Journal of Accountancy for 
October 1939, and I shall therefore not repeat it here in detail. Those 
of you who have read it will recall that my main theme was that more con­
sideration of the kind of information which is valuable to investors might
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be given in the preparation of those accounting reports designed for the
use of investors. I said that the investor must be made aware that not 
only are the principles of accounting not fixed and certain, but that the 
facts to which they are applied are often matters about which reasonable 
men can differ since, frequently, those facts rest upon human — and there­
fore fallible — Judgment; that the arithmetical form employed by account­
ants is a convenience which often expresses something that is but, at 
best, a conjecture about conjectures; that the Investor should not be de­
ceived as to the Inherent uncertainties which lie back of the prim and 
neat arithmetical facade of the accountant's report. I pointed out that, 
while the primary value to investors of the accountant’s report was to 
aid them in conjecturing the future net earnings of the corporation, they 
must recognize that no one can "determine” future earnings. "All that we 
can do,” I remarked, "is to conjecture*  to surmise — to guess. And that 
is true not only because: 'net earning's' is a relatively vague term -- in­
volving, as it does, fallible Judgments, as to depreciation, bad debts and 
other items — but, far more important because the past is no infallible 
guide to the future — except to an Omniscient Being, who knows all the 
events of the past and correctly interprets their meaning for the future. 
No man either knows all past events or is able thus to interpret them; no 
man can, therefore, with surety, predict, the future. . . Factors which 
are inherently impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate 
in advance may. . . upset a well-thought out business forecast. . . In 
an era where change, not permanence, is the norm, where the one certainty 
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is that, there is no certainty, we capitalize earnings which have been 
stable in the past as if they were sure to be stable forever more. We 
thus project the impermanent present into an imaginary permanent future 
. . .The truth is that profits are subject to hundreds of incalculables 
which neither accountants, nor anyone else, can foresee. Future earning 
power, and therefore 'value,' are, I repeat, a prediction, a guess. But 
that guess should be an educated guess. When I say that, I do not mean, 
of course, that, because complete certainty in accounting is lacking, there 
is or must be complete uncertainty. The accountant's performance lies be­
tween those polar extremes. . . We are but mortal, and contingency is the 
essence of mortality. Only in the grave do we escape it. Almost all 
thinking is based on mere probabilities, not on guarantees. . . To ask 
for complete and absolute exactitude, at all points in accounting, is ab­
surd. ”
And I concluded that part of my remarks thus: "The accountant. . . 
supplies some of the materials for, some of the ingredients of, the inves­
tor’s judgment. The ingredients he supplies should, therefore, be as pure 
as possible; but the investor's judgment (or that of his advisers) cannot 
be compounded solely of those ingredients, nor can the accountant be asked 
to do the work of the investment analyst. It is, accordingly, essential to 
emphasize the importance of good accounting, but a mistake to overempha­
size it to the exclusion of many other factors. I distinctly do not mean 
that the accountant is to forecast future earnings. I do not mean that 
he should give greater recognition to the fact that the principal interest 
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of the investor and his advisers is future prospects — earnings. In 
sum, I do not mean that the present financial statements should be re­
placed by earnings forecasts. But I do mean that financial statements . 
intended for investors should be designed with a view to their ultimate 
use in appraising earnings prospects. That should be the focus of the 
accountant’s attention in preparing reports for investors.”
Now those remarks on the importance of the income account to inves­
tors were not entirely unorthodox, excepting, perhaps, in their cautious­
ness. For your own American Institute of Accountants had said five years 
earlier that "the real value of the assets of any large business is 
dependent mainly on the earning capacity of the enterprise," and also 
said: "It is probably fairly well recognized by intelligent investors 
today that earning capacity is the fact of crucial importance in the 
valuation of an industrial enterprise, and that therefore the income ac­
count is usually far more important than the balance sheet."*
* Audit of Corporate Accounts (1934) pp. 6, 10.
And on April 26, 1940 — the very same day and at the same meeting 
at which Mr. Hancock delivered his paper — Mr. Bowlby, a partner of the 
well-known accounting firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie. & Co., after refer­
ring to and generally approving my October 1939 speech, said: "It may 
be accepted as the present philosophy of investment that earning power is 
the major factor. However, investment judgments are not formed on past 
results, except as those results throw light upon what may happen in the
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future. Hence, it is essential that financial statements disclose such 
information, regarding past events under known economic conditions, as 
will enable a prospective investor, to form intelligent conclusions with 
respect to future trends. Probably no great portion of the investing 
public can make an intelligent forecast, but those who can are entitled 
to the information. Hence, a principal objective of financial state­
ments is to disclose the reasonably prospective net earning power of the 
 
enterprise." I suggest that you contrast those remarks with Mr. Hancock's 
assertion that "it seems futile to think of an annual report as giving . 
any adequate basis for appraising the future value of securities.”
The uninformed reader of Mr. Hancock's paper would conclude that we 
on the SEC believe that the Investor should rely, to quote him again, 
"upon details of accounting almost to the utter neglect of other fac­
tors." Of course, that is not true. No one believes more emphatically 
than I — and I have said so, in public and private, many times that 
when one invests in a corporation he is inescapably investing in manage­
ment; that management involves the exercise of judgment and discretion; 
and that the qualities of good or bad management include many Intangibles 
which cannot possibly be recorded in figures.
Mr. Hancock, subsequently, made much the same point. But because of 
the impossibility of catching, in the net of efficient accountancy, all 
the facts bearing on the future of a corporate enterprise, he concludes 
that it is silly to use accountancy as one of the aids in surmising 
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a corporation’s future. He is guilty of a well-known fallacy — the con­
fusion (to use high-brow terminology) of a "necessary” with a "suffi­
cient” condition: Thus, while it is true that men cannot live without 
salt, that is not the equivalent of saying that men can live by salt alone. 
Similarly, while good accounting is indispensable, it is not, alone, suf­
ficient. And so, that accounting can never be precise, that it unavoidably 
involves Judgment factors, that it alone cannot be a guide to predicting 
future earning power and that, indeed, there is no unfailing method of 
predicting future earnings or future market values — all that does not at 
all compel the conclusion that accounting for investors cannot be so revised 
as to give to the investor some more help than accounting has heretofore 
given in affording him part of the data upon which he can base a guess as 
to future earnings and market values.
♦
Of course, there are no infallible means for arriving at precise 
Judgments as to such matters. Put we must do the best we can with the 
best knowledge we can obtain. "Every year, if not every day, we have to 
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge," 
said Mr. Justice Holmes. Surely, if the past history of a company’s 
earnings are told with approximate accuracy and the telling shows that 
the earnings have heretofore been very bad, that narrative is some help 
in forecasting the future earnings. And the same is true as to a nar­
rative showing a very handsome earning history.
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The point is that it is unsound to reason in any field that, because 
perfection is not possible, and because increased information will not 
furnish a foundation for completely guaranteed Judgments, therefore attempts 
to procure as much more adequate and useful information as is available — 
within the limits permitted by the nature of the subject matter -- is 
useless or nonsensical. It is well to bear in mind these wise words of 
Aristotle: "We must not look for the same degree of accuracy in all sub­
jects: we must be content in each class of subjects with accuracy of such 
a kind as the subject matter allows, and to such extent as is proper to 
the inquiry. . . An educated person will expect accuracy in each subject 
only so far as the nature of the subject allows.”
The history of thought in every field contains instance after instance 
of Just such objections to procuring more accurate information as have been 
voiced by Mr. Hancock. He referred*to  the Middle Ages. But, in the Middle 
Ages, men were burned at the stake for wanting to learn more about arithmetic, 
astronomy, and dozens of other subjects.
Galen’s writings on human anatomy were derived from studies of the 
insides of monkeys. When Vesalius subsequently began dissection of the human 
body in order to discover what it was like and how it differed from a 
monkey’s interior, he was charged with impiously trying to upset the established 
rules of anatomy. As Andrew D. White tells the story, the cry that went up 
against Vesalius "has been the same in all ages — the cry for what is called 
"sound learning". . . The idea has always been that the older studies are 
'safe.’" Certain men, one might say — thinking of Galen and Vesalius’s 
critics — have a fondness for "monkey business.”
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As to vast areas of experience, the human race is ignorant and will 
always remain largely so. There are factors in the universe as to which, 
because of our limited equipment, we shall always, almost surely, remain 
in darkness. Chance will always play an important part in human affairs. 
Comparatively little of the future will, I think, ever be precisely pre­
dictable. But because our Ignorance is and must be large, that is no 
reason why we should wallow in it, no reason why we should diminish 
1 
our . efforts to reduce  the unknowable, the unforeseeable, so far as 
possible.
It has been said that the better is the enemy of the best. Sometimes 
that is true. But it is no less true that the all-or-nothing men, those 
who will have nothing but the unattainably perfect, are the foes of Im­
provement. If all men had insisted that either they must fly with the skill 
of birds or not fly at all, aviation would be non-existent.
Negative perfectionism has often retarded the use of inventions. 
Robert Fulton’s steamboat was called "Fulton’s Folly.” DeForest’s ef­
forts to launch the wireless telephone were laughed at by the Western 
Electric Co. Not so very long ago the chief engineers of a leading tele­
phone company scoffed, before the American Institute of Engineers, at 
the automatic telephone.
Paradoxically, the calm acceptance of unavoidable imperfection im­
proves effectiveness. For such an admission rids us of an impossible task 
and enables us to face the environment unburdened by a feeling of the 
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necessity to stretch our aims beyond their practically possible scope. By 
conceding the immense amount of our inescapable ignorance, we become more 
alert in detecting facts. To the extent that one goes to sleep in a dream 
of attainable perfection, he becomes the victim of Uncertainties and 
imperfections which he ignores and which he therefore fails to allow for. 
The courageous attitude of accepting as inescapable the existence of 
uncertainties and imperfections, makes one’s world picture more complex; 
life is disclosed as far more precarious and difficult to conciliate. But 
such an attitude usually drives men to learn more about what was previously 
undetected, thereby reducing the area of the unknown and uncontrollable. It 
is indeed a paradox that, insofar as we become mindful that life is 
bound to be less perfect than we might like it to be, we tend to improve it. 
We should never have had steam engines if men had been content with dream 
engines. Airplanes were not invented by believers in wishing rugs.
III
Please do not misunderstand me. I am not for a moment charging 
Mr. Hancock with deliberately and intentionally distorting the views of 
the SEC. He is an honest man. But I surmise that what happened to him 
was something like this! As I’ve indicated, he Joined a campaign to have 
the Securities Act disembowelled. Now if the SEC in its administration 
were demanding perfection, if it were made up of academic extremists, then 
Mr. Hancock would have had an excellent argument in favor of such an amend­
ment. He, therefore, doubtless wanted to show that such was the case. Pre­
sumably, when he came to write his April 1940 paper, he vaguely remembered 
what I had said in October 1939. If I had said what, in his paper, he ascribed 
to me, it would prove his point. And so this is what I surmise!
Wishful memory came to his assistance. No doubt he honestly believed
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that I (or someone in the SEC) had made the absurd statements, which he 
erroneously imputed to us. He was, I suspect, so carried away by the 
music of his own rhetoric that he neglected to check up on the accuracy 
of his reporting.
Every lawyer knows that honest witnesses sometimes remember past events 
in accordance with their desires. The courts have observed that "men are 
prone to see what they want to see;” that "our sympathies and our pre­
judices bias our memories;” that "very honest persons often deceive them­
selves without being aware of it;” that, when a person has a deep interest, 
”his interest will, even if he wants to be truthful, impress upon his 
memory with much greater distinctness those things which make in his 
favor than it will those which make against him;” that ”our memories are 
easy and oftentimes unconscious slaves to our will”; and that ”the inter­
est of a perfectly creditable and innocent witness may, and often does, 
color his recollection and mold his impressions, sometimes even insensibly 
to himself.” It is also a fact that Mr. Hancock was inciting to war on 
the SEC and was perhaps influenced by the precept that men do not follow 
an uncertain call to battle.
Let us look now at the central thesis of Mr. Hancock’s criticism of 
the Securities Act: He points to the fact that most corporate managements 
are honest. With that the SEC heartily agrees. He goes on to say that 
there have been some "notorious exceptions” but that the ’’good human 
qualities” of "integrity, probity, ability and Judgment” of corporate 
management cannot be ’’injected into a situation where they do not exist 
through the operation of any Act of Congress or regulation based thereon.” 
He says that he "has little belief in the power of law to make men honest.” 
 
Again you will perceive a false picture made up of sharp blacks and  
whites: Of course, laws cannot make all men honest. But that does not  
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mean that one must go to the other extreme and say, "Therefore, let us 
abolish all laws prescribing standards of honesty," Of course, regulation 
is no substitute for good faith. There are thieves and murderers in the 
world despite the fact that for many years there have been laws against 
theft and murder. Should we, therefore, repeal the laws against theft 
and murder? Surely not. Laws have their effects, partly because fear 
of punishment for a violation of the laws acts as a deterrent and — far 
more important — because, after a while, the existence of the standards 
of minimum morality enacted into law creates habits and customs so strong 
that most men will not break with those habits and customs, will not even 
contemplate doing so, because they accept their operations as they do the 
air they breathe.
As I said, Mr. Hancock is a "negative perfectionist": If a law is 
not sure to be 100% effective, then, he feels, the law is not good enough 
and should not be enacted, or, if it is already enacted, should be repealed.
Mr. Hancock goes on to say that it is unthinkable to him that any 
body of sensible men "will say as their deliberate judgment that the present 
Securities Acts and their administration are in all respects reasonable." 
Again I am in accord with him — as far as he goes. For you will note 
the perfectionist phrase, "in all respects, " I defy anybody to find any 
statute or any administration of any statute or any human institution 
which is "in all respects" reasonable. I do not believe that, at any 
foreseeable time, there will be a world in which that will be possible. 
Human institutions are, as their name indicates, human, and therefore 
necessarily fallible.
The members of the SEC recognize that, because they are human, and 
are called upon to act, they are bound to make some mistakes.
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They would not want you to believe otherwise. For they are devoted to 
democracy. And only under a dictatorship is it a dogma that those who 
hold office can never err, *
The SEC Commissioners take only this to their credit: They do their 
conscientious best to avoid mistakes. When they find that they have erred, 
they admit it and change their ways. In April 1940, Mr. Brownell, counsel 
for Morgan Stanley & Co., in arguing before us, in the Dayton Power case, 
  
that one of our own rules was invalid and that we should reverse ourselves, 
said that he knew, from experience, that we could consider his argument 
"with the same disinterestedness as the Supreme Court.”
Mr. Hancock reports that he is ’’impatient over the attempt to improve 
everything at once." If he means instantaneous improvement, I share his 
views. But I deplore his intimation that a fanatical passion for im­
practical instantaneous improvement of everything is characteristic of the 
SEC. If the SEC were so daft, why is it that the Investment Company Act 
 
of 1940, at the express request of the business men in that industry, con­
ferred upon the SEC far more discretionary power than the SEC requested? 
That added discretion, in other words, was thrust upon us by those business­
men. Did not that fact — plus the fact that those businessmen vigorously 
urged the enactment of that statute this year and did all they could to 
avoid postponement of its enactment until next year — go to show that 
they were willing to trust to the good horse sense of the present person­
nel of the SEC? 
     * , ,
* Without claiming to be "good”, we do share something of the attitude 
expressed by the poet MacNeice:  
"And to the good who know how wide the gulf, how deep 
Between Ideal and Real, who being good have felt   
The final temptation to withdraw sit down and weep, 
We pray the power to take upon themselves the guilt.
Of human action, though still as ready to confess 
The imperfection of what can and must be built, 
The wish and power to act, forgive, and bless."
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And did not those facts, too, serve to answer the recent remarks of 
Mr. E. F. Connely, that the federal government is endeavoring to over­
regulate transactions in securities? For it is a notable fact, as I have 
said, that some of the principal members of his own Association were among 
those who, a few weeks ago, successfully urged Congress to pass the Invest­
ment Company Act. Obviously they did not accept Mr. Connely’s thesis that 
such regulation paralyzes free private enterprise and promotes totalitar­
ianism. They knew that the pre-regulation exploitation of thousands of 
middle-class investors might constitute a prelude to totalitarianism; that, 
if such exploitation continued, there would be grave danger of so angering 
the great middle class that it would be likely to turn to some dictator 
who, falsely promising to save the middle class, would destroy it, and, 
with it, democracy and capitalism. The truth is that the major function 
of the SEC laws and the SEC is conservative — to aid the conservation of 
our American profit system under our democratic form of government.
I repeat, we on the SEC are not perfectionists or panacea-mongers.
We are firm believers in sensible and intelligent working compromises. I 
wrote a whole book on that subject, published two years ago, in which I 
said this: All compromises are not evil or foolish. Life is full of Com­
promises. Walking is a compromise between falling down and standing up. , . 
Most dealings between human beings in daily life involve innumerable com­
promises; civilization is built on mutual yieldings and concessions. There 
are good and bad compromises. Some deserve applause and others condemnation. 
And so with objections to "half way measures" and "gradualness." Life 
could not go on without them. Sleep is a half-way measure. When one uses 
brakes on a steep hill he is practicing gradualness. To avoid gluttony 
or drunkenness is to be gradual and half-way.
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• But, although the SEC does not believe in perfection or in trying to 
improve everything at once, it does believe in constant sensible efforts 
at improvement. I had always thought that was the American way of life. 
I had always thought that the great progress which this country has made 
over the years was largely a result of the fact that we have never been sat­
isfied. We have constantly driven ahead to make things better and to make 
better things. That applies to manufacturers, doctors, scientists, law­
 
yers, and to government as well. There is no question but that it applies 
to accountants and auditors. We are not perfectionists, but we are "im­
provists.”
While we on the SEC are devoted to gradualness and intelligent com­
promises, we are definitely not appeasers. We go along with those who be­
lieve that there are some fundamental principles which must not be compro­
mised. The British people are valiantly demonstrating that attitude today. 
They have cast off their former false leaders who believed it possible to 
compromise concerning the minimal decencies of life with an absolutist 
whose purported compromises are but deceptive means for achieving a vic- 
tory by which he can work out his own absolutism that abolishes all free 
choice for the average man.
Such absolutism is abhorrent to Americans. We do not want dictators, 
nor even an elected government, to manage all the affairs of life. Large 
areas of industry need no governmental regulation. And, even where regu­
lation is needed, it should not be all of the same pattern. It should 
vary according to the peculiar characteristics of the particular regulated 
industry. In some industries, it should take the form of governmental con­
sultation and cooperation. In others, some form of industrial self-regu­
lation, with residual governmental supervision, is sufficient. In others, 
experience shows that varying degrees of more drastic regulation are nec­
essary.
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Rigid and inflexible uniformity in the field of accounting would be 
nonsensical. And Mr. Hancock, in attacking it, is knocking down a straw 
man. Perhaps I can explain the difference between his point of view and 
that of the average investor: He is an important investment banker. He 
personally knows many industrial leaders, and, without too much difficulty, 
he can obtain personal access to those he does not already know. He can 
talk personally to them about their business and form a first-hand judg­
ment of their abilities. In so far as he can trust the information he 
gets, he is able to place himself in a splendid position to know about 
the future of business or the future of any particular enterprise. In 
short, he is in a most enviable position - a position not available to 
most investors who want to find out about various enterprises. He can 
place an enormous amount of emphasis, in his analysis of a particular 
situation, on management — because he knows management personally. Put 
the average investor who is not in that position, must place his reliance 
on the record of management rather than on the personality of management. 
And for the fair presentation of that record, the investor must rely to a 
considerable extent on you accountants. The investor may miss many factors 
which Mr. Hancock can discover, but, if you give the investor or his in­
vestment analyst enough details, he will find out at least whether or not 
the record is a good record or a bad record and how it compares with other 
records in the same industry. That is especially true, if the investor 
can feel confident that accounting practices and principles are relatively 
standardized and that the accountant who has reviewed the data is com­
pletely independent and reasonably curious.
To Mr. Hancock the unregulated annual report to stockholders is 
apparently good enough. But Mr. Hancock’s perspective can hardly be 
said to be that of the average investor. He is much more fortunate.
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He lives in an environment which, for most investors, is nonexistent.
He needs to have much less down on paper than the average stockholder. 
But it is difficult to believe that important investment advisory 
services, like Poors, Moody’s, or Standard Statistics would want to go 
back to relying on the meagre accounting data contained in the average 
report to stockholders. In fact, I cannot imagine that even the ana- 
lytical staff of the investment trust sponsored by Mr. Hancock’s own 
firm would want to be obliged to rely solely on that information. Of 
course I would admit that the average stockholder must find detailed 
balance sheets and income accounts — especially when there are a lot 
of footnotes — pretty heavy going. But I fail to find there even a 
         
weak argument against the inclusion of such details. After all, the 
influence of the informed investor and the investment adviser, availing 
himself of fuller information, is quickly felt in the market place.*  
Artificial market prices based on needlessly inadequate information — so 
ruinous to the mass of investors in the past — are today made almost 
impossible, as to registered securities, by the use of detailed and more 
adequate information. I am sure that you accountants will not at all 
agree with Mr. Connely that "investors today actually receive in under­
standable form less pertinent information than before the enactment of 
the Securities Act of 1933."
* As to benefit to investors, through investment analysts, of the work 
of the SEC, see Graham and Dodd Security Analysis (2d ed. 1940). 
pp 49, 50, 53. 146, 229, 280, 286, 406, 420, 426, 446, 456, 598, 600, 
609, 656.
And so, to repeat, I feel that we on the SEC and you in the 
accounting profession can take pride in our constant efforts to improve 
the standards of corporate reporting. I feel confident, that we have 
already made a contribution so substantial that, even if the Securities 
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laws were to become a dead letter, corporate reporting would never again 
shrink to its former status. The stature of your profession has grown 
immeasurably in the past few years. Your increasing independence is the 
envy of other professions. Neither you nor we will ever attain perfec­
tion, but I anticipate that we will spend a good many more years on our 
joint effort to improve the quality and value of information to security 
holders.
What we want for investors is the best available data practically 
obtainable. That they procure it may make life duller for some persons. 
As Abe Martin said, "Nobuddy kin talk half as interestin’ as the feller 
that ain’t hampered by facts or infermashun.”
--- 0O0----
